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
- 25X1 1. Prior to the visit of MAO Tse-tung to Moscow, there were major differences of opinion within the Chinese Communist Politburo over the question of policies to determine the course of the Communist revolution in China. Many persons favored the adoption of a policy of neutrality in international affairs and concentration on the solution of internal affairs, whereas others favored a policy of active participation in the Communist world revolution. No decision on this issue had been reached when MAO left Peiping. When he reached Moscow, it appears that the Soviets impressed on him the stringency of the world situation, the likely imminence of a third world war, and the probability that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would lose its gains unless it participated in such a war as an ally of the USSR. MAO then sent for CHOU En-lai and a series of firm accords were reached on the subject of Sino-Soviet cooperation. The entire substance of these accords is unknown but it is apparent that they are mainly of a military character. Since MAO's return to Peiping, CCP leaders talk and think in terms of policies designed to prepare for war.
2. The decision for full cooperation with the USSR met with some opposition in the upper levels of the CCP, but when adopted by the Politburo, the top hierarchy of the Party swung into line behind it. The adoption of the decision was a victory for LIU Shao-ch'i, LIU Ning-i, LI Li-san and CHOU En-lai, the main protagonists of the policy which it forwarded; and, it was a defeat for the military group. The main military figures involved appear to be CHU Te, NIEH Jung-chen, CH'EN Yi and YEH Chien-ying. In spite of the fact that this difference of opinion may persist in the Politburo, it does not appear at all likely that the military figures and their associates will be able to do other than defer to the will of the politicians. NIEH, YEH and CH'EN have, through the machinations of the pro-Soviet faction, lost much influence in recent months and this lesson has not been lost on their military colleagues. Thus, whatever factionalism may obtain in the Politburo, it is more on a basis of personality conflict than on policy conflict.
3. It cannot be said with any degree of accuracy that there is factionalism in an acute form in the lower echelons of the CCP or in the Army although there

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are certain factors in the present China situation which could well bring on factionalism in those organizations. Changes in kanpu, or political workers, in the Party and political commissars in the Army are tending to be the main cause. The rapid expansion of the CCP in the past two years has necessitated a vast increase in the number of kanpu, particularly in metropolitan areas. In organizing the cities, the old kanpu, who mistrusted and disliked the city people and who were regarded by them as ignorant yokels, proved incompetent. New kanpu were trained as rapidly as possible. These were mainly middle school students or university lower classmen who were at home in urban environments. Many of these were assigned to the cities and displaced old kanpu, who were reassigned to the countryside. The latter were disgruntled over this, particularly since they regarded the newcomers as inexperienced, untried and fundamentally unreliable. The new kanpu, both in city and country, have failed to get close to the people, and to win their affection and support. The old kanpu realize this, and tend to blame new high echelon policies for this state of affairs. A similar situation exists in the Army, where absorption of former Nationalist units has required the training and assignment of new political commissars. The new commissars are more experienced and sophisticated than the old, and the two groups entertain a mutual dislike. The new commissars have not the sense of self sacrifice of the old, but are ambitious and self seeking. The newcomers think of themselves as policemen and disciplinarians and there is a growing gulf between the commissars and the Army.

4. Perhaps the greatest gulf and potential breeder of factionalism in the CCP is the difference in opinion on policy between the Politburo on one hand and the lower echelons of the party and the Army on the other. The lower echelons of the CCP are generally unaware of the details, or even the existence, of high level Party decisions committing China to full cooperation with the USSR in the event of war and to aggressive action in forwarding the Communist revolution elsewhere in Asia. The lower ranks in the CCP are generally of the opinion that their major duty, after the occupation of China by the taking of Taiwan and Tibet, is to proceed with the solution of China's internal problems. They further believe that the Communist revolution will occur in all countries as a spontaneous thing, and they have not been conditioned to believe that China will have an active role in forwarding this revolution by military, or quasi-military action.
5. Similarly, the Army is looking toward a period of peace, wherein internal problems can be solved and the army greatly reduced in size. The Communist leaders have sought to motivate the Army mainly in terms of the class struggle. The political commissars have urged self interest on the troops, by telling them that in fighting the civil war they were fighting to eliminate their oppressors who were keeping them and their families in poverty. This line has been stressed much more than the "American imperialist" theme. Thus, the rank and file of the Army feel compelled to proceed with the liberation of Taiwan and Tibet, but feel under no compulsion to continue under arms beyond the point where this is accomplished. Indeed, personnel talk in terms of "going home," when Taiwan is occupied. This desire is reenforced by what they hear from their families. The core of the Army was conscripted from North China rural communities, which want the soldiers back to work on the land. Any military operations beyond China's boundaries would be very unpopular.
6. Except for minor disciplinary actions, there have, as yet, been no signs of surges within the CCP. However, there are some signs that surges will occur when Taiwan has been taken. At that time it will be necessary to reorganize the Party and the Government for new tasks. "Unreliable elements", who cannot be counted on to support and carry out the strong policies now adopted by the Politburo will be weeded out. The non-Communist, minority parties expect to be among the first victims of this surge. This process has already begun; low ranking members of minority parties have been

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arrested for "reactionary activities", though not specifically for their party membership. Such persons have been confined briefly and then released.

7. In conclusion, factionalism in the Politburo is probably not present to a point where it could seriously affect CCP policies. On the other hand, there is a gulf between the Politburo and lower echelons of the CCP, between the CCP and the people, and between the Politburo and the rank and file of the Army. None of these schisms operate as yet to weaken the CCP, but in the event of a world war they would be significant and susceptible to exploitation. The split between the CCP and the groups cooperating with it in the Government is deep and irreconcilable.

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